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The United States and Nuclear Terrorism
in a Changing World: A Jurisprudential
View
Louis Rene Beres*
On Friday, February 26, 1993, a massive explosion caused by a car
bomb rocked the 110-story World Trade Center in New York City.'
Although seven people were killed and more than a thousand injured,
the harms generated by this act of terrorism were substantially less
catastrophic than what might have happened had the blast been
nuclear. Recognizing that we may not be so "lucky" in the future,
this Article considers both tactical and jurisprudential aspects of the
problem-a problem that may well be the most serious threat to
American security in the years ahead.
I. Introduction
Human beings have lived on earth for about 800 lifetimes, most of
which have been spent in caves. It should come as no surprise, therefore,
that barbarism often molds the terrorist imagination and that limits to
terrorist destructiveness are imposed largely by technology. If, in the
next several years, terrorist groups should gain access to nuclear
explosives, nuclear reactors, or both, the consequences could prove
overwhelming.2
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1. Deborah Sontag, Explosion at the Twin Towers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at Al.
2. Jurisprudentially, such consequences may constitute "crimes against humanity." For
definition of such crimes, see Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into force on Aug. 8, 1945), for the United States on
Sept. 10, 1945 for definition of such crimes). The U.N. General Assembly affirmed the principles
of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the
Tribunal. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946). This affirmation was
followed by Resolution 177(11), directing the U.N. International Law Commission to "(a) Formulate
the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the
judgment of the Tribunal, and (b) Prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of
mankind." G.A. Res. 177(11), at 112, U.N. Doc. A/S19 (1947). The principles formulated are known
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With these facts in mind, this Article will examine the growing
dangers of nuclear terrorism for the United States and the prospective
remedies that might be implemented.' Beginning with a consideration
of the authoritative criteria that distinguish permissible from
impermissible forms of insurgency under international law, the Article
proceeds to an identification of the threat and behavioral strategies of
counter-nuclear terrorism at both national and international levels.
Immediately thereafter, an examination of possible forms and effects of
nuclear terrorism is undertaken, followed by a close look at preemption
from both a jurisprudential and tactical standpoint. This Article
concludes with a look at the controversial but increasingly rational
consideration of assassination as a lawful strategy of counter nuclear
terrorism.4
II. Identifying the Terrorists
Who are the terrorists? Operationally, pertinent departments of the
government of the United States 'currently use the following definitions:
as the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg
Tribunal. U.N. GAOR 4th Comm., 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
3. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein spoke menacingly of an ultimate trump card - a
terrorist army that could attack U.S. interests everywhere in the world. Bruce Hoffman, Saddam
Hussein's Ultimate Fifth Column-Terrorists, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1990, at M2. Should this army
be "deployed" in collaboration with supportive Palestinian terrorist figures (e.g., Abul Abbas, Abu
Nidal, Ahmad Jabril), the alliance could pose a new and substantial risk of nuclear terrorism. Of
course, this risk might be experienced not only by the United States, but also by Israel and the
"moderate Arab" regimes which comprised much of the anti-Saddam coalition.
4. In the final analysis, of course, truly effective counter nuclear terrorism, in the fashion of
truly effective remedies for international and intranational war, would require a far more profound
set of strategies-a retreat from the delirious collectivism that characterizes virtually all human
societies. Although inconceivable as a pragmatic remedy, such a retreat-in theory at least-would
reveal a rejection of what philosopher Martin Heidegger called das Mann, the anonymous mass or
crowd that suffocates private growth and individual responsibility. C.G. Jung, Psychology and
Religion, in 2 THE WORLD OF PSYCHOLOGY: IDENTITY AND MOTIVATION 476 (G.B. Levitas ed.,
1963). Aware that human inclinations to political crime have been forged from the fusion of Self
into the collectivity, a genuinely promising strategy of counter terrorism would learn to accept the
task of Nietzsche's Zarathustra "to be called a robber by the shepherds." According to Nietzsche,
"To lure many away from the herd, for that I have come. The people and the herd shall be angry
with me. Zarathustra wants to be called a robber by the shepherds." Freud, too, understood that
need for such learning. Examining the "group mind" and other accounts of "collective mental life,"
Freud recognized fully the dangers of the crowd. Similarly, Carl Jung observed:
If people crowd together and form a mob, then the dynamics of the collective man are set
free-beasts or demons which lie dormant in every person till he is part of a mob. Man
in the crowd is unconsciously lowered to an inferior moral and intellectual level, to that
level which is always there, below the threshold of consciousness, ready to break forth
as soon as it is stimulated through the formation of a crowd.
Id. at 476-77.
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- the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a
revolutionary organization against individuals or property with the
intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often
for political or ideological purposes.
Department of Defense, 1983
- the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
FBI, 1983
- premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state
agents.
Department of State, 1984
* violent criminal conduct apparently intended: (a) to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; (b) to influence the conduct of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (c) to affect the conduct
of a government by assassination or kidnapping.
Department of Justice, 1984
- the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to
further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to
intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups or to modify
their behavior or policies.
The Vice-President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 1986'
None of these definitions is truly suitable to our concerns, i.e.,
enhancing the role of international law in confronting the hazards of
nuclear terrorism to the United States. In this connection, a genuinely
useful definition, inter alia, must clarify the difference between lawful
and unlawful insurgencies. Such an understanding must be based upon
more than the selective intuitions of geopolitics. Specifically, it must rest
upon well-established jurisprudential standards that reflect international
law.6
5. These definitions can be found in Rushworth M. Kidder, Unmasking Terrorism: The Fear
of Fear Itself, in VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 14 (Bernard Schechterman & Martin Slann eds., 3d ed.,
1993).
6. International law, of course, is part of U.S. law. Recalling the words used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana, the principal case concerning the incorporation of
international law into this country's municipal law:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty,
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International law has consistently proscribed particular acts of
international terrorism.' At the same time, however, it has permitted
certain uses of force. These uses derive "from the inalienable right to
self-determination8 and independence of all peoples under colonial and
racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and the legitimacy of
their struggle, in particular, the struggle of national liberation movements,
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Chartee and the
relevant resolutions of the organs of the United Nations."'0  This
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to
the customs and usages of civilized nations.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1900). See also The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Edwards, J.
concurring) (dismissing the action, but making several references to domestic jurisdiction over
extraterritorial offenses), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985) ("concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over
acts in violation of significant international standards ... embodied in the principle of 'universal
violations of international law'").
7. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents 28 U.S.T. 1975, 13 I.L.M. 43 (adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly Dec. 14, 1973, entered into force for the United States Feb. 20, 1977); Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into
force for the United States Dec. 13, 1972); Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force
for the United States Dec. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Tokyo Convention]; Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 (entered into force for the United
States Oct. 14, 197 1) [hereinafter Hague Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564 (entered into force for the
United States Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter Montreal Convention]; International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1983) (entered into force for the United States Dec. 7, 1984); European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism, January 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90 (entered into force on August 4,
1978). On December 9, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution
condemning all acts of terrorism as "criminal." United Nations Resolution on Terrorism, G.A. Res.
40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 301, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985). Never before had
the General Assembly adopted such a comprehensive resolution on this question. Yet, the issue of
particular acts that actually constitute terrorism was left largely unaddressed, except for acts such as
hijacking, hostage-taking, and attacks on internationally protected persons that were criminalized by
previous custom and conventions. Id.
8. On self-determination, see generally Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66,
U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or not
an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for Under Article 73e of the Charter, G.A.
Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-
Determination of Peoples].
9. See generally U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
10. Report ofthe Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp.
No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973).
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exemption, from the 1973 General Assembly Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on International Terrorism, is corroborated, of course, by
Article 7 of the UN General Assembly's 1974 Definition of Aggression:
Nothing in this definition, and in particular, Article 3 (inventory of
acts that qualify as aggression) could in any way prejudice the right
to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in
the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of
these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support,
in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity
with the above-mentioned Declaration."
International law has also approved certain forms of insurgency that
are directed toward improved human rights where repression is neither
colonial nor racist. Together with a number of important covenants,
treaties, and declarations, the UN Charter codifies many binding norms
on the protection of human rights. Comprising a well-defined
11. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975). Article 7 refers to the October 24, 1970
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States. See G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971). See also Aureliu Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current
Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N. GAOR, Subcomm. on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/404/Rev. 1 (1981) (giving a
comprehensive and authoritative inventory of sources of international law concerning the right to use
force on behalf of self-determination).
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"regime,"' 12 these rules of international law 3 are effectively enforceable
only by the actions of individual states14 and/or by lawful insurgencies. 5
12. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(111), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.S.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
.13. The origins of these rules, in part, can be discovered in (1) the Magna Carta; (2) the Petition
of Right; (3) the English Bill of Rights; and (4) the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen. The Magna Carta (1215) marked an important first step toward constitutional privilege and
the subjection of kings to parliamentary will. An account of the original versions of the Charter and
later editions and commentaries appears in WILLIAM S. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 165-85 (2d ed.
1914). The final version, dated June 15, 1215, can be found in ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND,
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 17-32 (1965). The Petition of Right (1628), in the fashion of the
U.S. Declaration of Independence, begins with a long recital of grievances arising from royal abuse.
Id. at 68-71. Mentioning the Magna Carta, it condemns forced loans (identifying unlawful
imprisonments made in the course of such exactions); complains of the failure to discharge men from
unjust imprisonment on habeas corpus; and-inter alia-opposes the billeting of soldiers among the
people against their will and court martials against civilians who join with soldiers in misconduct
(while others escaped punishment for civilian offenses on the pretext, by royal officers, that they
were triable only by court-martial law). Id. The King's first response to the Petition (June 2, 1628)
was evasive, but on June 7, 1628, Royal assent was given. Id. at 72. The English Bill of Rights
(1689), together with the Magna Carta of 1215 and the Petition of Right of 1628, represents one of
three great documents of British Constitutional Liberty and the subsequent international law of human
rights. Like the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights suggests, by its form, the U.S. Declaration of
Independence. Moreover, certain clauses of the Bill of Rights of 1689 strongly resemble provisions
of the U.S. Bill of Rights of 1791. Id. at 91-97. The right of petition in Clause 5 is echoed in the
First Amendment. ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 91-97 (1965). The
restriction in Clause 6 concerning the keeping of a standing army suggests Article i, Section 8,
Clause 12 of the U.S. Constitution. Id. Free speech in Parliament guaranteed by Clause 9 of the Bill
of Rights is reflected in Article 1, Section 6 of the U.S. Constitution. Id. The Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), which preceded and became a part of the French
Constitutions of 1791, 1793 and 1795, is more sweeping than the U.S. Bill of Rights. See the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, in HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 744-45 (Albert
P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1987). Its substance, as in the cases of the previously discussed compacts
and documents, may be taken as the source of the current human rights regime. Article 1 proclaims
that men are equal in rights. Id. Article 2 defines as fundamental the human rights of liberty,
property, security, and resistance to oppression. Id. Article 3, which declares that "[t]he basis of all
sovereignty lies, essentially, in the Nation," rejects the royal doctrine that France was merely the
personal property of its kings. Id. Perhaps the broadest statement of human rights is contained in
Article 4, which declares nothing less than the following: "Liberty is the capacity to do anything that
does no harm to others. Hence the only limitations on the individual's exercise of his natural rights
are those which ensure the enjoyment of these same rights to all other individuals. These limits can
be established only by legislation." Id.
14. Such actions bring to mind the principle of humanitarian intervention. For sources
supporting this principle, see ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT
226 (1987) (stating that human rights violations of genocide, slavery, and widespread torture justify
humanitarian intervention); Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian
Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185, 198 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) (discussing humanitarian intervention for human rights
violations); Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of
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Where it is understood as resistance to despotism, insurgency has
roots as permissible practice in the Bible and in the writings of ancient
and medieval classics. It can be found, for example, in Aristotle's
Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547, 597-611 (1987) (setting forth
criteria for humanitarian intervention); Robert Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human
Rights, 53 IOWA L. REv. 325, 345 (1967) (justifying humanitarian intervention because existing
international mechanisms provide inadequate protection). Cf. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 340 (1963) (observing that the disappearance of humanitarian
intervention from modem practice presents a beneficial development); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 105 (1968) (stating law against intervention); PHILIP C.
JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 169 (1948) (discussing only intervention
by States to protect own nationals).
15. Recalling that the sources of international law (according to Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice) are found also in international custom, the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions, and the writings of highly qualified publicists,
additional support for the lawfulness of certain forms of insurgency can be identified in non-treaty
sources. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
334. For example, the U.S. Declaration of Independence, as an expression of natural law, is an
authoritative instance of the "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," and it
therefore sets limits on the authority of every government. See THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). Since justice, according to the Founding Fathers, must bind all human
society, the rights articulated by the Declaration cannot be reserved only for Americans. To deny
these rights to others would be illogical and self-contradictory since it would undermine the
permanent and universal law of nature from which the Declaration derives. Thomas Paine
represented this understanding, affirming:
The Independence of America, considered merely as a separation from England, would
have been a matter of but little importance, had it not been accompanied by a Revolution
in the principles and practices of Governments. She made a stand, not for herself only,
but for the world, and looked beyond the advantages herself could receive.
THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 151 (Everyman ed. 1792). Indeed, in view of the longstanding
support for various forms of insurgency in multiple sources of positive and natural law, it is
reasonable to argue that a peremptory norm of general international law (a jus cogens norm) has
emerged on this matter. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/27, reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969). Even a treaty that might seek to criminalize forms of insurgency that this
peremptory norm protects would be invalid. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, "A
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law." Id. art. 53. Article 64 of the Convention extends the concept to newly emerging
peremptory norms: "If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing
treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates." Id. art. 64.
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Politics, Plutarch's Lives and Cicero's De Officiis.'6 Support for such
insurgency is not the creation of modem international law. 7
This brings us to the first jurisprudential standard for differentiating
between lawful insurgency and terrorism, commonly known as "just
cause." Where individual states prevent the exercise of human rights,
insurgency may express law-enforcing reactions under international law.
For this to be the case, however, the means used in that insurgency must
be consistent with the second jurisprudential standard, commonly known
as "just means."'"
In deciding whether a particular insurgency is an instance of
terrorism or law-enforcement, therefore, states must base their
evaluations, in part, on judgments concerning discrimination,
proportionality, and military necessity. Discrimination, of course,
concerns the essential distinction between combatants and non-
combatants. Military necessity concerns the essential limitation on levels
of force imposed by the overriding imperatives of restraint.
Proportionality requires that the amount of destruction allowed be
16. See FRANKLIN L. FORD, POLITICAL MURDER 41-55 (1985). Elsewhere, Cicero, citing to
the Greeks, approvingly offers further support for tyrannicide:
Grecian nations give the honors of the gods to those men who have slain tyrants. What
have I not seen at Athens? What in the other cities of Greece? What diving honors have
I not seen paid to such men? What odes, what songs have I not heard in their praise?
They are almost consecrated to immortality in the memories and worship of men. And
will you not only abstain from conferring any honors on the saviour of so great a people,
and the avenger of such enormous wickedness, but will you even allow him to be borne
off for punishment? He would confess-I say, if he had done it, he would confess with
a high and willing spirit that he had done it for.the sake of the general liberty; a thing
which would certainly deserve not only to be confessed by him, but even to be boasted
of.
Marcus T. Cicero, The Speech of M.T. Cicero In Defense of Titus Annius Milo, in SELECT
ORATIONS OF M.T. CICERO 208 (C:D. Yonge trans., 1882) (Titus Annius Milo, leader of Lanuvium,
was alleged to have committed tyrannicide.).
17. The right of insurgency, of course, is affirmed in the U.S. political tradition:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, That all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form
of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or
to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety
and happiness.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
18. The laws of war, the rules ofjus in bello or just means, include rules concerning weapons
and the conduct of warfare as well as humanitarian rules. See, e.g., JAMES R. FOX, DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 240 (1992). Codified primarily at the Hague and Geneva
Conventions and known thereby as the law of the Hague and the law of Geneva, these rules attempt
to bring discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity into belligerent calculations.
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calculated with regard to the importance of the objective. Once force is
applied broadly to any segment of human population, blurring the
distinction between combatants and noncombatants, terrorism is taking
place. Similarly, once force is applied to the fullest possible extent,
restrained only by the limits of available weaponry, terrorism is
underway.
The principle of proportionality has its origins in the biblical Lex
Talionis,19 the law of exact retaliation. This "eye for eye, tooth for
tooth" expectation is found in at least two separate passages in the
biblical Pentateuch or the Jewish Torah.2" These Torah rules are likely
related to the Code of Hammurabi, the first written evidence for
penalizing wrongdoing with exact retaliation.
In contemporary international law, which is of paramount interest
here, the principle of proportionality can be found in the customary and
traditional view that a state offended by another state's use of force can,
if the offending state refuses to make amends, take "proportionate"
reprisals.2 Evidence of the rule of proportionality can also be found in
Article 4 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.22
Similarly, Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides that in time of war or other public emergency, contracting
parties may derogate from the provisions of the Convention, as long as
the rules of proportionality are followed. 2' Article 27(1) of the
American Convention on Human Rights allows such derogations in "time
of war, public danger or other emergency which threatens the
19. See Antony Flew, Retrospect and Prospect, Retribution and Deterrence, 25 lSR. L. REV.
376 (1991) (contemporary discussions of Lex Talionis); Michael Davis, Determining Penalties (1):
Criteria for Sentencing, Criminal Desert, Harm and Fairness, 25 ISR. L. REv. 524-48 (1991).
20. Exodus 21:22-25 (Torah); Deuteronomy 19:19-21 (Torah); Leviticus 24:17-21 (Torah).
21. See Naulilaa Arbitration 2 RIAA 1013 (1928) and Air Services Agreement Arbitration 16
RIAA 5 (1963), cited in INGRID DET'rER DE LUPis, THE LAW OF WAR 75 n.152 (1987).
22. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21 st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
23. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Under international law, the principle of proportionality is contained in
both the rules governing the resort to armed conflict (jus ad bellum) and in the rules governing the
actual conduct of armed conflict (jus in hello). See, e.g., Fox, supra note 16, at 238, 240. In the
former, proportionality relates to self-defense; in the latter, it relates to conduct of hostilities. Id.
Proportionality, derived from the more basic principle that belligerent rights are not unlimited,
is a principle which seeks to establish criteria for limiting the use of force. Like many
principles, it is not simple, and its requirements in a given instance are open to debate.
It can refer to two different things: (a) proportionality of a belligerent response to a
grievance - in which sense it is a link betweenjus ad bellum andjus in bello; and (b)
proportionality in relation to the adversary's military actions or to the anticipated military
value of one's own actions, including proportionality in reprisals.
ADAM ROBERTS & RiCHARD GUELFF, DOcuMENTs ON THE LAws OF WAR 5 (2d ed. 1989).
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independence or security of a party" on the condition of
proportionality.
2 4
The legitimacy of a certain cause can never legitimize the use of
certain forms of violence. The ends can never justify the means. As in
the case of war between states, every use of force by insurgents must be
judged twice, once with regard to the justness of the objective and once
with regard to the justness of the means used in pursuit of that
objective."
Significantly, from the point of view of international law, any use
of nuclear weapons by an insurgent group would represent a serious
violation of the laws of war.26  These laws have been brought to bear
24. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M.
673 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978).
25. The means criterion has important implications for extradition. For an inventory of
extradition agreements in force between the United States and other countries, see CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICES, HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF MAJOR LAWS, TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND
ExECUTIVE DOCUMENTS 239-326 (1987). One problem in such agreements has been the "political
offense exception" to extradition, a provision that extradition need not or shall not be granted when
the acts with which the accused is charged constitute a political offense or an act connected with a
political offense. Id. The Reagan administration addressed the problem of the "political offense
exception" in the context of the Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. See Abraham D. Sofaer, U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Current Policy No. 762, The Political Offense Exception and Terrorism (1985). Recognizing
that there exist egregious examples of overly broad applications of the exception and that claims of
immunity from extradition based on "relative" political offenses have always been problematic, the
supplementary treaty explicitly identifies particular crimes that may no longer be regarded as political
offenses excepted from the extradition process. Id. These crimes are those typically committed by
terrorists: aircraft hijacking and sabotage; crimes against internationally protected persons; hostage
taking; murder; manslaughter; malicious assault; kidnapping; and specified offenses involving
firearms, explosives, and serious property damage. Id. Although the treaty concerns the political
offense exception only between the two countries involved, it represents part of a potentially
incremental process that could be expanded to include many other states. Moreover, limits on the
political offense exception are already contained in other, complementary sources of international law.
Id.
26. For assessments of nuclear weapons under international law, see The Illegality of Nuclear
Weapons: Statement of the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy, 8 ALTERNATIVES: J. WORLD
POL'Y 291 (1982); RICHARD FALK ET AL., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981);
John H.E. Fried, First Use of Nuclear Weapons-Existing Prohibitions in International Law, in
BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 21 (198 1); Matthew Lippman, Nuclear Weapons and International Law:
Towards A Declaration on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Nuclear Humancide, 8
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 183 (1986); Bums H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International
Law: Illegality in Context, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1983); Ian Brownlie, Some Legal
Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 437 (1965); Francis A. Boyle, The
Relevance of International Law to the 'Paradox' of Nuclear Deterrence, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1407
(1986); James A. Stegenga, Nuclearism and International Law, 4 PUB. AFF. Q. 69 (1990); GEOFFREY
BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980); JAMES T. JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE
RESTRAINT OF WAR (1981); NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (1987); Daniel J. Arbess,
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upon non-state actors in world politics by Article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949,27 and by the two protocols to the
conventions. 2" Protocol I makes the law concerning international
conflicts applicable to conflicts fought for self-determination against alien
occupation and against colonialist and racist regimes.29 A product of the
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts that ended
on June 10, 1977, Protocol I (which the decolonization provisions of the
UN Charter and resolutions of the General Assembly 3I justified)
The International Law of Armed Conflict in Light of Contemporary Deterrence Strategies: Empty
Promise or Meaningful Restraint?, 30 MCGILL L.J. 89 (1984); E.D. Thomas, Atomic Bombs in
International Society, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 736 (1945); E.C. Stowell, Laws of War and the Atomic
Bomb, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1945); John N. Moore, Nuclear Weapons and the Law Enhancing
Strategic Stability, 9 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 263 (1983); Eugene V. Rostow, The Great Nuclear Debate,
8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 87 (1981); Elliot L. Meyrowitz, The Opinions of Legal Scholars on
the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 111 (1987); Bums H. Weston, Nuclear
Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment, 28 MCGILL L.J. 543 (1983); John
H.E. Fried, The Nuclear Collision Course: Can International Law Be of Help, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 97 (1985); FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE CRIMINALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, (Nuclear Age
Peace Found., Waging Peace Series Booklet #27, 1991).
27. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 1; Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
28. See Protocol Relating to Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1977 U.N.
JURID. Y.B. 95, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol 1];
Protocol Relating to Victims of Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1977 U.N. JURID.
Y.B. 135, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II].
29. According to Part 1, Article 1(4):
The situations referred to . . . include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise
of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and
the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Protocol 1, supra note 28, art. 1(4).
30. The Charter of the United Nations expressly establishes the right to self-determination in
Chapters I and II. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55. The principle of the right to self-determination
is established indirectly in Chapter XII, which provides that one of the objectives of the trusteeship
system is to promote the progressive development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories towards
"self-government or independence" taking into account, inter alia, "the freely expressed wishes of
the peoples concerned." Id. art. 76(b).
31. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2189, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); G.A. Res. 2326, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at4, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); G.A.
Res. 2465, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at4, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2548,
U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 5, U.N. Doc. A17630 (1964); G.A. Res. 2708, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2878, U.N. GAOR, 26th
Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2908, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess.,
Supp. No. 30, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 3163, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No.
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brings irregular forces within the full scope of the law of armed
conflict.32 Protocol II, also additional to the Geneva Conventions,
concerns the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts.33
Hence, Protocol II applies to all armed conflicts not covered by Protocol
I between a state's armed forces and dissident armed forces that take
place within the territory of the state.34
In support of the principle that foreign intervention" is unlawful
unless understood as an indispensable corrective to gross violations of
human rights,36 most major texts and treatises on international law (an
authoritative source of international law according to Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice)37 have long opined that a
30, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 3328, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 7,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
32. Protocol 1, supra note 28.
33. Protocol II, supra note 28.
34. See SAMUEL PUFENDoRF, 2 ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL
LAW 139 (Frank G. Moore trans., 1964) (an early expression of limits under the law of war). The
author states:
As for the force employed in war against the enemy and his property, we should
distinguish between what an enemy can suffer without injustice, and what we cannot bring
to bear against him, without violating humanity. For he who has declared himself our
enemy, inasmuch as this involves the express threat to bring the worst of evils upon us,
by that very act, so far as in him lies, gives us a free hand against himself, without
restriction. Humanity, however, commands that, so far as the clash of arms permits, we
do not inflict more mischief upon the enemy than defense, or the vindication of our right,
and security for the future, require.
Id.
35. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, 7. See also Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971). Annex to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 28, at 122-23, U.N. Doc. A/8028/Annexes (1970); Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doe. A/RES/2131 (XX)/Rev. I (1966).
36. As an example of the difficulties in ensuring human rights under existing international law,
all major human rights treaties require the submission of periodic reports to supervisory bodies. In
this connection, the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva is the main organizational entity for carrying
out the United Nations human rights programme. The Centre in Geneva services the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
See U.N. CTR. HUM. RTS. & U.N. INST. TRAINING & RESEARCH (UNITAR), MANUAL ON HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORTING UNDER SIX MAJOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS,
HR/PUB/91/1 (1991). But states in violation of human rights norms are most unlikely to report
unfavorably on themselves.
37. According to Article 38:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or
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state is forbidden to engage in military or paramilitary operations against
another state with which it is not at war. Today, the U.N. Charter3" and
the authoritative interpretation of that multilateral treaty in Articles 1 and
3(g) of the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression codify the long-
standing customary39 prohibition against foreign support for lawless
insurgencies. 0
The legal systems embodied in the constitutions of individual states
provide that all states must normally defend against aggression."
Hersch Lauterpacht expressed this peremptory principle. According to
Lauterpacht, the scope of state responsibility for preventing acts of
insurgency or terrorism against other states involve the following rule:
particular, establishing rules recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly-qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 59 Stat 1031, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L
L. 190 (1945).
38. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 5.
39. Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice describes international
custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court of
Justice, supra note 37, art. 38(l)(b). In this connection, the essential significance of a norm's
customary character under international law is that the norm binds even those states that are not
parties to the pertinent codifying instrument or convention. Indeed, with respect to the bases of
obligation under international law, even where a customary norm and a norm restated in treaty form
are apparently identical, the norms are treated as separate and discrete. During the merits phase of
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) stated, "Even if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in
content, and even if the States in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law
and on that of customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence." See Military
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 14 (June 27). Moreover, in many states,
customary international law is binding and self-executing but an act of the legislature is required to
transform conventional law into internal law.
40. In the United States, these codifications are supported by various elements of federal law.
Under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 StaL 424 (1961); the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 7 U.S.C. § 1691 (1988); the Peace
Corps Act, Pub. L. No. 87-293, 75 Stat. 612 (1961); the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, 12 U.S-C.
§ 635 (1988); and the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1983), the U.S. shall not provide
assistance to any country "which the President determines (1) grants sanctuary from prosecution to
any individual or group which has committed an act of international terrorism, or (2) otherwise
supports international terrorism." Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620A., 75
Stat 424 (1961). Significantly, according to section 620A(b): "The President may waive the
application of subsection (a) to a country if the President determines that national security or
humanitarian reasons justify such waiver." Id. In other words, U.S. support for international law
concerning state assistance to terrorists can be reversed where the President determines that "national
security or humanitarian reasons" dictate overriding support for the terrorists and/or their state
patrons. Id.
41. See. e.g., U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8.
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International law imposes upon the State the duty of restraining
persons within its territory from engaging in such revolutionary
activities against friendly States as amount to organized acts of force
in the form of hostile expeditions against the territory of those States.
It also obliges the States to repress and discourage activities in which
attempts against the life of political opponents are regarded as a
41proper means of revolutionary action.
Lauterpacht's rule reaffirms the Resolution on the Rights and Duties
of Foreign Powers as Regards the Established and Recognized
Governments in Case of Insurrection adopted by the Institute of
International Law in 1900.4' His rule, however, stops short of the
prescription Emmerich de Vattel offered. According to Vattel's The Law
of Nations, states that support terrorism directed at other states become
the lawful prey of the world community.4 In his words:
If there should be found a restless and unprincipled nation, ever ready
to do harm to others, to thwart their purposes, and to stir up civil
strife among their citizens, there is no doubt that all others would
have the right to unite together to subdue such a nation, to discipline
it, and even to disable it from doing further harm.45
States also have an obligation to treat captured insurgents in
conformity with the basic dictates of international law. Although this
obligation does not normally interfere with a state's right to regard as
common or ordinary criminals those persons not engaged in armed
conflict (that is, persons involved merely in internal disturbances, riots,
isolated and specific acts of violence, or other acts of a similar nature),
it does mean that all other captives remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of humanity and the dictates of public
conscience.4 6
42. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1950).
43. Id.
44. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
130 (Charles W. Fenwick trans., 1964) (1758).
45. Id.
46. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. See also the Martens clause. The Martens clause
is included in the Preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions (not in the articles sections)
and is given higher status in the 1977 Protocol I by being included in the main text of Article I.
Protocol 1, supra note 28. In situations not covered by the Protocol or by other international
agreements, the clause provides that "civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles
of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience." Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No.
539 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910; for the.United States Jan. 26, 1910). Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
NUCLEAR TERRORISM IN A CHANGING WORLD
In cases where captive persons are engaged in armed conflict, an
additional obligation of states may exist to extend the privileged status of
prisoner of war (POW) to such persons. The insurgent's respect for the
laws of war does not affect this additional obligation. While all
combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules do not automatically
deprive an insurgent combatant of his right to protection equivalent in all
respects to the protection accorded to prisoners of war. This right,
codified by the Geneva Conventions, is now complemented and enlarged
by the two protocols to those conventions.
47
How has U.S. foreign policy responded to jurisprudential
expectations concerning insurgency? The Reagan administration, for
example, embraced only one standard of judgment: Anti-Sovietism.
Human rights had nothing to do with this standard. It follows that efforts
to overthrow allegedly pro-Soviet regimes were always conducted by
"freedom fighters" (even where these efforts involved rape, pillaging, and
mass murder),48 while efforts to oppose anti-Soviet regimes (even by the
-most oppressed and downtrodden peoples of genocidal regimes) were
always conducted by "terrorists."
However, U.S. foreign policy is not the only source of possible
nuclear terrorism against this country. Even if there were a dramatic
transformation of current policy orientations under the Clinton
Administration, 49 a significant hazard would remain. To, reduce this
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1977 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 95, reprinted in 16 i.L.M. 1391 (1977)
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
47. See Protocol I, supra note 28; Protocol 11, supra note 28.
48. The best example of such "freedom fighters" were the Nicaraguan Contras. Ultimately, U.S.
support of the Contras was determined to be in direct violation of the final judgment entered against
the United States by the International Court of Justice on June 27, 1986. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 i.C.J. 4 (June 27). U.S. acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice began on August 14, 1946, with a declaration issued
by President Harry S. Truman, after two-thirds of the Senate had given their approval. Multi-lateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, Connally Reservation, 1965-66 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 67,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/I (1981). Although this acceptance was subject to the so-called Connally
reservation, it was manifest that the Nicaraguan issues were not "essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States of America." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27). Moreover, the U.S. argument that the disagreements with Nicaragua were
of a political nature and should therefore have been assigned to the Security Council (where, of
course, the U.S. enjoys a veto) seemed inconsistent with U.S. views on a prior matter before the
ICJ-the case filed by the ,United States on November 29, 1979, against Iran. See United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24). There was never any
valid basis in law for arguing that the case brought by Nicaragua against the United States was
political while the case brought by the United States against Iran was not.
49. Significantly, however, the Clinton Administration has already acted to celebrate and even
sanctify terrorism. On September 13, 1993, President Clinton hosted Israel's formal agreement with
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hazard, major improvements are needed in preventing terrorist access to
assembled nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants, and nuclear waste
storage facilities. Included in these improvements should be measures to
contain the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.
Regarding the threat of nuclear terrorism against the United States,
the shortcomings of the extant nonproliferation regime are readily
apparent. North Korea, it appears, has disregarded its NPT obligations
and moved ominously toward a nuclear weapons capability.5"
Moreover, elements of this capability may soon be shared with Iran (if
it hasn't taken place already), 5 a relationship that would substantially
increase terrorist group access to pertinent nuclear technologies. This is
the case not only because of the expanded number of nuclear weapons
states and the ideological hostility of these states to the United States in
particular, but also because North Korea or Iran or both might willingly
cooperate with anti-American terrorist organizations.5"
II. Recognizing the Threat
To undertake acts of nuclear terrorism, insurgent or revolutionary
groups would require access to nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants,
or nuclear waste storage facilities. Should they seek to acquire an
assembled weapon, terrorists could aim at any of the tens of thousands
of nuclear weapons now deployed in the national or alliance arsenals of
the United States, four successor states of the former Soviet Union,
the P.L.O., a widely-documented terrorist organization. Elaine Sciolino, Arafat Arrives in US. to
'Make Peace,'N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at Al. Such action by the United States can only give
aid and comfort to terrorists generally and undermines any long-term jurisprudential remedies for
nuclear terrorism. The Palestine Liberation Organization was treated formally as a terrorist group
in Klinghoffer, where the federal court determined, inter alia, that it had jurisdiction over the P.L.O.
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
. 50. A crisis atmosphere surrounding North Korean nuclearization has persisted since early this
year (1994). On April 21, 1994, North Korea informed the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) that it planned to remove nuclear fuel from its biggest reactor by early May, a step that
would enable it to greatly expand its nuclear weapons arsenal. See David E. Sanger, North Korea
Will Remove Nuclear Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at A3. Also on April 21, U.S. Secretary of
Defense William Perry warned at a news conference in Seoul, South Korea, hat spent fuel from the
North Korean reactor could yield enough raw material to make four or five nuclear weapons. Id.
The extraction of used fuel rods would mark a new phase for North Korea's nuclear program, as the
material could be reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium.
51. Cooperation on missiles between Iran and North Korea is already well-documented. See,
e.g., CORDESMAN, AFTER THE STORM: THE CHANGING MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
418-19 (1993).
52. Iran, of course, established Hezbollah as a surrogate terror organization. For comprehensive
treatment of the lran-Hezbollah association by this author, see Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Iran and
Prospects for Nuclear War in the Middle East, 1993 STRATEGIC REV. 52-60.
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France, England, India, China, and, most likely, Israel" and Pakistan.
Moreover, because the number of nuclear weapons states is likely to
grow, such terrorists are destined to have an enlarged arena of
opportunity.54 In the absence of the recent Gulf War, 55 this list might
also have included Iraq.5
Should they seek to manufacture their own nuclear weapons,
terrorists would require both strategic special nuclear materials" and the
expertise to convert them into bombs or radiological weapons. Both
53. On Israel's nuclear weapons see, for example, SHLOMO ARONSON, THE POLITICS AND
STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: OPACITY, THEORY AND REALITY, 1960-
1991 (1992); FRANK BARNABY, THE INVISIBLE BOMB: THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST (1989); MCGEORGE BUNDY, DANGER AND SURVIVAL: CHOICES ABOUT THE BOMB IN THE
FIRST FIFTY YEARS (1988); YAIR EVRON, ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR DILEMMA (1987); PIERRE PEAN, LES
DEUX BOMBES (1982); TAYSIR NASHIF, NUCLEAR WARFARE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: DIMENSIONS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES (1984); SEYMOUR M. HERSCH, THE SAMSON OPTION: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR
ARSENAL AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1991); LEONARD S. SPECTOR, THE UNDECLARED BOMB
(1988); SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY (Louis R. Beres ed., 1986).
54. This brings us to Iraq, which may still be making steady progress on nuclear weapons
development. Baghdad, as we know, had attempted to purchase detonation capacitors of U.S. origin
suitable for use in nuclear explosives and may still be seeking components of uranium gas centrifuges
from a variety of suppliers. The "feed material" for such centrifuges could come from the uranium
yellowcake Iraq has already imported from Brazil, Portugal, Niger, and other sources as well as from
domestic uranium recovered from phosphate mining operations. Given that Iraq now has close ties
to the PLO and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, Baghdad's nuclear efforts suggest a
potentially significant Middle Eastern source of opportunity for nuclear terrorism.
55. For a comprehensive compilation of authoritative documents pertaining to the Gulf War,
see Current Documents: Gulf War Legal and Diplomatic Documents, 13 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 281
(1991) [hereinafter Current Documents].
56. Coalition military action against Iraqi forces commenced on January 16, 1991. U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY: THE HISTORY OF THE GULF WAR 215 (1992)
(including a complete collection of the U.N. Resolutions concerning the Gulf War). This collective
resort to force represented a last attempt to remove Iraqi military forces from Kuwait, which had
been occupied since Saddam Hussein's invasion of August 2, 1990. Id. at 7. On the very same day
of the Iraqi invasion, UN Security Council Resolution 660 (1) condemned the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait; (2) demanded that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its forces to the
positions in which they were located on August 1, 1990; and (3) called upon Iraq and Kuwait to
begin immediate intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and to support all efforts
in this regard, especially those of the League of Arab States. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess.,
at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). See also Current Documents, supra note 55, at 306 (summarizing
S.C. Res. 660). The war ended when Iraq formally accepted all of the coalition's terms for a
permanent ceasefire on March 3, 1991. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP, TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY:
THE HISTORY OF THE GULF WAR 399F (1992). Significantly, although elimination of all Iraqi
nonconventional force capabilities was an integral part of the ceasefire agreement, Iraq continued
after the war to seek a thermonuclear weapons capacity and to disguise this effort from UN
inspectors. Id. at 412.
57. On this point, Senator John Glenn, chair of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
reported on March 9, 1993, that "the main reason Iraq did not have a nuclear weapon is because it
lacked the necessary plutonium or highly-enriched uranium called HEU. That was all they lacked,
just the fissile material." Disposing of Plutonium in Russia, Hearing Before the Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing].
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requirements are now well within the range of terrorist capabilities.
Several hundred commercial nuclear power plants are operating in the
world today, each with the capacity to produce bomb-capable plutonium.
Moreover, several dozen plants in more than twenty countries can now
process plutonium from spent reactor fuel.
Significantly, the amounts of nuclear materials present in other
countries will probably expand further." Pilot reprocessing plants that
extract weapons-usable plutonium from spent reactor fuel rods constitute
dangerous conditions. Unless immediate and effective steps are taken to
inhibit the spread of plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment
facilities to other countries, terrorist opportunities to acquire fissionable
materials for nuclear-weapons purposes could reach very high levels.59
The amount of weapons-usable material needed to make a bomb is
remarkably small. As one commentator notes,
To make an atomic bomb, a terrorist or a would-be proliferator would
need to get hold of only 5kg of weapon-grade plutonium or 15kg of
weapon-grade uranium, less than you would need to fill a fruitbowl.
At present, the world probably contains about 250 tons of this sort of
plutonium and 1500 tons of the uranium. To lose one bomb's worth
from the stock is the equivalent of losing a single word from one of
three copies of THE ECONOMIST. But the loss would be harder to
detect. The world's stock of nuclear-explosive material is dispersed
and hoarded. Almost none of this material is covered by international
58. Here, it must be understood that an additional source of such bomb-grade materials is the
dismantling of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union. With this in mind, Senator John
Glenn has commented in the Senate hearings on Disposing of Plutonium in Russia that "[tihe Russian
dismantlement of over 25,000 nuclear weapons and what is done with bomb-grade material must be
at the top of our nonproliferation efforts." See Hearing, supra, note 57. In testimony before Senator
Glenn's Committee hearings, Joseph E. Kelley, Director-in-Charge of International Affairs Issues for
the National Security and International Affairs Division of the U.S. General Accounting Office,
described U.S. efforts to help former Soviet Republics secure and destroy weapons. Id. These
efforts have their statutory basis in the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, 22 U.S.C. §
2551 (1990). More recent and pertinent legislation includes the Former Soviet Union
Demilitarization Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 5901 (1993), and the Freedom for Russia and Emerging
Eurasian Democracies and Open Market Support Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-511, 106 Stat. 3320
(1992).
59. Here in the United States, efforts are already underway to reduce such opportunities. The
Department of Energy stopped making plutonium for bombs in the 1980s, but the stockpile of
plutonium is growing because the United States is now dismantling some of its own (obsolete)
nuclear warheads. Matthew L. Wald, Nation Considers Means to Dispose of its Plutonium, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at Al, A9. On September 27, 1993, President Clinton announced the
formation of an inter-agency task force to consider how much plutonium the country needs in the
post-Soviet era and how to dispose of surplus. Id. Ironically, the dismantling of nuclear weapons
- both from the United States and Russia - while reducing the risks and consequences of nuclear
war, may create an enlarged risk of certain forms of nuclear terrorism. Id.
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accounting rules. And more than half of it is inside the chaotic relic
of the former Soviet Union.6°
To manufacture its own nuclear weapons, a terrorist group would
also require expertise. It is now well-known that such expertise is widely
available. A 1977 Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report, after
describing the two basic methods of assembling fissile material in a
nuclear explosive (the assembly of two or more subcritical masses using
gun propellants and the achievement of supercriticality of fissile material
via high explosive), stated that militarily useful weapons with reliable
nuclear yields in the kiloton range can be constructed with reactor-grade
plutonium using low technology.6' Indeed, it continued, "given the
weapons material and a fraction of a million dollars, a small group of
people, none of whom had ever had access to the classified literature,
could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device."62
Another terrorist path to nuclear capability could involve the
sabotage of nuclear reactor facilities. It is now apparent that such acts
could pose monumental problems for responsible governmental
authorities. This is especially apparent in the aftermath of the Soviet
nuclear accident at Chernobyl in the spring of 1986.
Although not generally recognized, installations with large
radioactive inventories that can be released are themselves potential
weapons of mass destruction. Even when they are constructed with great
care, nuclear reactors are vulnerable to willful destruction through
disruption of coolant mechanisms both inside and outside of the
containment structure. Moreover, it is likely that reactor vulnerability
will be increased to the extent that terrorists acquire precision-guided
munitions and associated forms of shoulder-fired weaponry.
In the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing and the ease
with which an intruder invaded the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in
February 7, 1993, nuclear power plants may be far more vulnerable to
terrorist destruction than previously assumed.63 Indeed, Ivan Selin,
60. How To Steal an Atom Bomb, THE ECONOMIST, June 5, 1993, at 15. Regarding the
impending surpluses of both separated weapons and civil plutonium, it should be noted that all
plutonium, except relatively pure Pu-238, is weapons-usable. F. Berkhout et. al., Disposition of
Separated Plutonium, in SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY (1992), reprinted in Hearing, supra, note
57, at 63. See also J. CARSON MARK, NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE, EXPLOSIVE PROPERTIES OF
REACTOR-GRADE PLUTONIUM (Wash., D.C., 1990).
61. See generally CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS (1977).
62. Id.
63. Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear Plants Said to Be Vulnerable to Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1993, at 18. The emission of radioactivity from reactors cannot always be calculated reliably.
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Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, remarked that the two
events have prompted his agency to rethink its security regulations.64
What can be done to protect against sabotage of or attacks upon
nuclear reactors by terrorists? According to the Report of the
International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, a
project of the highly-esteemed Nuclear Control Institute in Washington,
D.C., the following measures need to be taken:
1. Denial of access to nuclear facilities should be the basic
consideration in protecting against sabotage.
2. Thorough vigilance against the insider threat is needed.
3. Guard forces should be thoroughly trained and authorized
to use deadly force.
4. The basis used for designing physical protection of nuclear
plants should be reviewed to ensure that it accurately
reflects the current threat.
5. Power reactors should have adequate security provisions
against terrorists.
6. Research reactors should have adequate security provisions
against terrorists.
7. Reactor safety designs should be reexamined to protect
against an accident caused by terrorists.
8. IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) physical
protection guidelines should be reviewed and updated.
Unlike conventional or nuclear weapons effects, reactor emissions are subject to a number of
particular variables including, among others, the quantity, composition, and rate of deposition of
materials. A moderate release from a reactor the size of Three Mile Island - 880 megawatts of
electricity (Mwe) - that has been operating for upwards of three months could contaminate 500
square miles. A major release could affect 3 to 5000 square miles, occasioning occupation
restrictions lasting decades. Moreover, because reactors might be clustered together, the dangers are
enlarged if the contents of more than one were discharged and/or if there were a release of the
inventories of spent fuel (inventories customarily located at reactor sites). For an informed and
comprehensive consideration of reactor attack effects, see BENNETT RAMBERG, DESTRUCTION OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY FACILITIES IN WAR (1980); Bennett Ramberg, Attacks on Nuclear Reactors: The
Implications of Israel's Strike on Osiraq, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 653 (1982-83).
64. Wald, supra note 63.
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9. Protection standards should be spelled out
unambiguously.65
In the end, however, efforts at "hardening the target" will not be
enough. Although physical security measures are indispensable and need
to be implemented internationally,"' an all-consuming preoccupation
with guards, firearms, fences, and space-age protection devices would be
counterproductive. A behavioral strategy of counter-nuclear terrorism,
one that is directed toward producing certain changes in the decisional
calculi of terrorist groups and their sponsor states, is a prerequisite.
IV. Recognizing the Adversary: Applying Behavioral Strategies
A behavioral strategy must be based upon a sound understanding of
the risk calculations of terrorists. Until the special terrorist stance on the
balance of risks that can be taken in world politics is understood, we will
not be able to identify an appropriate system of sanctions. Although
terrorists are typically able to tolerate higher levels of death and injury
65. See NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITTE, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE ON
PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 10-11 (1986).
66. Principal responsibility in the United States for the protection of assembled nuclear weapons
rests with the Department of Defense (DOD). From the standpoint of effective worldwide standards
for nuclear weapons, it appears that the most promising course would involve widespread imitation
and replication of the best of those measures and procedures developed by the DOD. These measures
and procedures, which are continually being upgraded and scrutinized, include the following: a
Permissive Action Link (PAL) program, which consists of a code system and a family of devices
integral or attached to nuclear weapons that have been developed to reduce the probability of an
unauthorized nuclear detonation; a Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), which consists of the
continual screening and evaluation of nuclear duty personnel to assure reliability; a series of storage
area classifications that delineate viable zones of protection; an Intrusion Detection Alarm (IDA)
system; security forces capable of withstanding and repelling seizure efforts by terrorists; two-man
concept control during any operation that may afford access to nuclear weapons, whereby a minimum
of two authorized personnel, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with
respect to the task to be performed and familiar with applicable safety and security requirements,
shall be present; counterintelligence and investigative services to actively seek information concerning
threats to nuclear weapons; and carefully prepared logistic movement procedures to ensure nuclear
weapons security in transit.
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than states, 67 there is a threshold beyond which certain costs become
intolerable.
To understand this threshold, we must first recall that there is no
such thing as "the terrorist mind." Rather, there are a great many terrorist
minds, a broad potpourri of ideas, methods, visions, and objectives. To
seek a uniformly applicable strategy of counter-nuclear terrorism,
therefore, would be foolhardy. Nevertheless, in spite of the obvious
heterogeneity that characterizes modem terrorism, it would be immensely
impractical to formulate a myriad of strategies tailored to particular
groups. What must be established is a limited and manageable number
of basic strategies that are formed according to the principal types of
terrorist group behavior. By adopting this means of "blueprinting"
effective counter-nuclear terrorist action, policy makers can utilize a
decision-making strategy in which options are differentiated according to
the particular category of risk-calculation involved.
This is not to suggest that each terrorist group is comprised of
individuals who exhibit the same pattern of behavior, i.e., the same stance
on the balance of risks that can be taken in pursuit of particular
preferences. Rather, each terrorist group consists, in varying degrees, of
persons with disparate motives. Since it is essential, from the point of
view of creating the necessary decisional strategy, that each terrorist
group be categorized according to a particular type of risk-calculation, the
task is to identify and evaluate the leadership strata of each terrorist
group in order to determine the predominant ordering of preferences.
In terms of actually mounting an effective counter-nuclear terrorist
strategy, therefore, governments must organize their activities according
to the following sequence of responsibilities:
1. Appraise the terrorist group under scrutiny for the purpose
of identifying leadership elements.
67. The PLO, of course, has already declared itself a state. But such a declaration does not
satisfy the generally-accepted criteria for statehood identified under international law: control over
a fixed and clearly defined territory; a population; a government; and the capacity to engage in
diplomatic and foreign relations. See, e.g., Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26,
1988, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097; see also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 858
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). Here, in seeking favorable classification for litigation, the PLO requested the court
to accept its self-description as a state. More precisely, the PLO characterized itself as "the
nationhood and sovereignty of the Palestinian people." Id. at 857. The court, however, found the
PLO to be an "unincorporated association." Id. It determined that the PLO lacked the key elements
of statehood, as articulated by long-settled norms of international law. Id. (citing National
Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 (1987)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989)).
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2. Appraise the leadership elements for the purpose of
identifying predominant patterns of risk-calculation.
3. Examine the decision-making strategy for the purpose of
identifying the appropriate type of counter-nuclear terrorist
strategy, i.e., the strategy that corresponds with the
identified pattern of risk-calculation.
In so organizing their counter-nuclear terrorist activities, governments can
begin to develop a rationally-conceived "behavioral technology" that
distinguishes contingencies of reinforcement according to the particular
type of terrorists involved. To deal effectively with the prospective
problem of nuclear terrorism, it is essential to correlate deterrent and
remedial measures with the preference orderings and modus operandi of
the particular terrorist group(s) in question.
For example, if a terrorist group displaying the self-sacrificing value
system of certain Islamic factions in the Middle East were to threaten
nuclear violence, it would be inappropriate to base deterrence on threats
of physically punishing acts of retaliation.68 Here, negative physical
sanctions, unless they are devastating enough to ensure destruction of the
group itself, are bound to be ineffective. Indeed, such sanctions might
even have the effect of a stimulus. Instead of orthodox threats of
punishment, deterrence in this case should be based upon threats that
promise to obstruct preferences that the terrorist group values even more
highly than physical safety.
Such threats, therefore, should be directed at convincing terrorists
that the resort to nuclear violence would mitigate against their political
objectives. To support such threats, steps would probably have to be
taken to convince the terrorists that higher-order acts of violence are apt
to generate broad-based repulsion rather than support. As long as the
threatened act of nuclear violence stems from propagandistic motives,
terrorists who associate such violence with unfavorable publicity may be
inclined to less violent strategies.
Deterrence in this case might also be based upon the promise of
rewards. Such a strategy of "positive sanctions" has been left out of
current studies of counter-terrorism; yet, it may prove to be one of the
few potentially worthwhile ways of affecting the decisional calculi of
terrorist groups with self-sacrificing value systems. Of course, in
68. Islam has historically sought to establish a world public order based on divine legislation
and to enforce it by thefihad. Thefihad is the Islamic bellumjustum and is the very basis of Islam's
relationships with other nations. For an authoritative study of Islam and international law, see
SHAYBANI'S SIYAR: THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS (Majid Khadduri trans., 1966).
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considering whether this sort of strategy is appropriate in particular
situations, governments will have to decide whether the expected benefits
that accrue from avoiding nuclear terrorism are great enough to outweigh
the prospective costs associated with the promised concessions.
The reasonableness of such a strategy is also enhanced by its
probable long-term systemic effects. Just as violence tends to beget more
violence, rewards tend to generate more rewards. By the incremental
replacement of negative sanctions with positive ones, a growing number
of actors in world politics, terrorists as well as states, are apt to become
habituated to the ideology of a reward system and to disengage from the
dynamics of a threat or punishment system. The cumulative effect of
such habituation could conceivably be a more peaceful and harmonious
world and national system.
There is, however, an antecedent legal question that must be raised.
This question involves the principle, nullum crimen sine poena! (No
crime without a punishment!).69 This major principle of international
law, essential to civilized international relations, obligates all states to
seek out and prosecute the perpetrators of crimes, including perpetrators
of terrorism. It follows that offering positive sanctions to terrorist
groups, however tactically effective, would represent a violation of
indispensable legal norms.
For another example, we may consider the case of a terrorist group
that exhibits a preference ordering very much like that of an ordinary
criminal band, i.e., its actions are dictated largely by incentives of
material gain, however much these incentives are rationalized in terms of
political objectives. If such a terrorist group were to threaten nuclear
violence, it would be as inappropriate to base deterrence on threats of
political failure or negative public reception as it would be to threaten
self-sacrificing ideologues with personal harm. Rather, deterrence in this
case should be based largely upon the kinds of threats that are used to
counter orthodox criminality.
69. The earliest expressions of nullum crimen sine poena can be found in the Code of
Hammurabi (c. 1728-1686 B.C.), the Laws of Eshnunna (c. 2000 B.C.), the even-earlier code of Ur-
Nammu (c. 2100 B.C.), and of course, the Lex Talionis, or law of exact retaliation, presented in three
separate passages of the Jewish Torah or Biblical Pentateuch. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 202, 216 (1979). At Nuremberg, the words used by
the Court, "So far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed
to go unpunished," represented an emphatic contemporary reaffirmation of nullum crimen sine
poena. Id. at 284. Punishment is, quite plausibly, the original meaning of justice. For a
comprehensive consideration of these concepts, and their interdependence, see ROBERT C. SOLOMON
& MARK C. MURPHY, WHAT IS JUSTICE? CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS (1990); Haim
H. Cohn, On the Immorality of Punishment, 25 ISR. L. REV. 284 (1991).
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This is not to suggest, however, that threats of physically punishing
retaliation will always be productive in dealing with this type of terrorist
group. Even though this particular type, unlike the self-sacrificing variety
considered in the first example, is apt to value personal safety in its
ordering of preferences, threats to impair this safety may be
misconceived. Indeed, a great deal of sophisticated conceptual analysis
and experimental evidence now seems to indicate that, in certain cases,
the threat of physical punishment may actually prove counter-productive.
Contrary to the widely-held conventional wisdom on the matter,
taking a "hard-line" against terrorists may only reinforce antagonism and
intransigence. Recent experience indicates that physical retaliation
against terrorists often causes only a shift in the selection of targets and
a more protracted pattern of violence and aggression. The threat of
physical punishment against terrorists is apt to generate high levels of
anger that effectively raise the threshold of acceptable suffering. This is
the case because anger can modify usual cost/benefit calculations,
overriding the inhibitions ordinarily associated with anticipated
punishment.
To this point, the discussion of negative sanctions has been limited
to physical punishment. However, there is considerable evidence that all
kinds of negative sanctions, economic as well as physical, stiffen rather
than diminish terrorist resistance. Whatever the nature of negative
sanctions, they appear to generate anger, which causes terrorists to value
retaliation (or counter-retaliation, whichever the case may be) more
highly than the objectives that have given rise to terrorist activity in the
first place.
For a third example, we may consider the case of a terrorist group
that exhibits a primary concern for achieving one or another form of
political objective, but lacks a self-sacrificing value-system. If this sort
of terrorist group were to threaten nuclear violence, it would be
appropriate to base deterrence on a suitable combination of all of the
negative and positive sanctions discussed thus far. This means that steps
should be taken to convince the group that (1) nuclear violence would
mitigate against its political objectives, (2) certain concessions would be
granted in exchange for restraint from nuclear violence, and (3) certain
physically punishing or otherwise negative acts of retaliation would be
meted out if nuclear violence were undertaken.
In deciding upon what exactly constitutes a suitable configuration of
sanctions, governments will have to be especially discriminating in their
manner of brandishing threats of physical punishment. In this connection,
it is worth noting that threats of mild punishment may have a greater
deterrent effect than threats of severe punishment. From the vantage
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point of the terrorists group's particular baseline of expectations, such
threats - when threats of severe punishment are expected - may even
appear to have positive qualities. Catching the terrorist group by surprise,
such threat behavior is also less likely to elicit the high levels of anger
and intractability that tend to override the inhibiting factor of expected
punishment. Moreover, the threat of mild punishment is less likely to
support the contention of official repression, a contention that is often a
vital part of terrorist group strategies for success.
In reference to the actual promise of rewards as an instrument of
deterrence, governments may find it worthwhile to consider whether a
selected number of particular concessions would produce a gainful net
effect. In other words, recognizing that threats of severe punishment
produce rationality-impairing stress, which in turn produces greater
resistance rather than compliance, governments may discover that the
promise of rewards communicates feelings of sympathy and concern,
which in turn diminish terrorist resistance. With such an understanding,
governments may begin to delimit the particular concessions that they are
prepared to make.
A fourth and final example that illustrates the need to correlate
deierrent and situational measures with particular preference orderings
centers on the case of terrorist groups spurred on by the need for
spectacular self-assertion, by destruction as a release from powerlessness.
From the standpoint of preventing nuclear violence, this type of terrorist
group presents the greatest problem. Faced with terrorist groups that long
to act out desperate urgings, governments may be confronted with
genuine psychopaths and sociopaths. Clearly, since the preference that
would need to be obstructed in this case is neither political success nor
personal profit but the violent act itself, and since personal safety is
unlikely to figure importantly in the terrorist risk-calculus, deterrence of
nuclear terrorism must be abandoned altogether as a viable strategy.
Instead, all preventive measures must concentrate upon limiting the
influence of such terrorists within their particular groups and maintaining
a safe distance between such terrorists and the instruments of higher-order
weapons technologies.
If the apparent danger is great enough, governments may feel
compelled to resort to a "no holds barred" counter-terrorist campaign. In
such cases, governments must be aware that the inclination to escalate
violence would signify the erosion of power. Violence is not power.
Where the latter is in jeopardy, the former is increased. Understood in
terms of anti-terrorism measures, this suggests that the imprudent
escalation of violence by public authorities can destroy power. Taken to
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its outermost limits, such escalation can lead to rule by sheer violence
and the substitution of "official" terror for insurgent terror.70
V. Behavioral Strategies at the International Level
Counter-nuclear terrorist strategies within states require
differentiating sanctions according to the particular type of terrorist group
involved. However, since nuclear terrorism might take place across
national boundaries, raising questions of jurisdiction, 7' the basic
principles of these strategies must also be applied internationally.
Of course, there are specific difficulties involved in implementing
behavioral measures of counter-nuclear terrorism internationally. These
difficulties center on the fact that certain states sponsor and host terrorist
groups and that such states extend the privileges of sovereignty to
insurgents on their land. While it is true that international law forbids a
state to allow its territory to be used as a base for aggressive operations
against another state with which it is not at war, a state which seeks to
deal with terrorists hosted in another state is still in a very difficult
position.
To cope with these difficulties, like-minded governments must create
special patterns of international cooperation. These patterns must be
based upon the idea that even sovereignty must yield to gross inversions
of the norms expressed in the authoritative human rights regime and
humanitarian international law. They must, therefore, take the form of
collective defense arrangements between particular states that promise
protection and support for responsible and law-enforcing acts of counter
nuclear terrorism.
Such arrangements must entail plans for cooperative intelligence
gathering on the subject of terrorism and for the exchange of the
information produced; an expanded and refined tapestry of agreements on
70. Yet, as we will consider later in this Article, effective counter nuclear terrorism could
potentially require, both intranationally and internationally, official resort to assassination. Such an
argument, of course, is viscerally distasteful and not likely to be welcome within the orthodox body
of jurisprudential analysis. At the same time, however, in view of the need to consider the right of
the community to be safeguarded from nuclear terrorism against ordinary human rights of due process
under international law, a reasonable balance of harms calculation may be essential. Recognizing
the extraordinary and unprecedented destructive potential of nuclear terrorism, the alternative to such
a calculation may be nothing less than the willful sacrifice of entire societies.
71. For an authoritative inventory of bases of jurisdiction in international law, see Harvard
Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935). See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 4 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986); Christopher L. Blakesley, United
States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1982); and
L. HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (2d ed. 1987).
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extradition of terrorists;72 multi-lateral forces to infiltrate terrorist
organizations and, if necessary, to take action against them; concerted use
of the media to publicize terrorist activities and intentions; and even
counter-terrorism emergency medical networks. Such arrangements might
also entail limited and particular acts directed toward effective counter-
nuclear terrorism.
International arrangements for counter-nuclear terrorist cooperation
must also include sanctions for states that sponsor or support terrorist
groups and activities. As in the case of sanctions applied to terrorists,
such sanctions may include carrots as well as sticks. Until every state in
the world system calculates that support of counter-nuclear terrorist
measures is in its own interests, individual terrorist groups will have
reason and opportunity to escalate their violent excursions.
The contemporary international legal order has tried to cope with
transnational terrorism since 1937, when the League of Nations produced
two conventions to deal with the problem." These conventions
proscribed acts of terror-violence against public officials, criminalized the
impairment of property and the infliction of general injuries by citizens
72. At this time, the United States has extradition agreements with over 100 countries. The
treaties range in age from an 1856 agreement with the Austrian Empire, which is still in force with
respect to one of its successor states (Hungary) to the protocol with Canada, which entered into force
in November 1991. See Consular Conventions, Extradition Treaties and Treaties Relating to Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLATS): Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations,
S. Rep. No. 674, 102d Cong. 10 (1992). The Office of International Affairs (OIA) in the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice plays an important role in extradition matters. From OlA's
inception in 1979, its attorneys have cooperated with the Department of State in negotiating all new
extradition agreements. According to testimony by Robert Mueller, III, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice:
In general, our goal in extradition negotiations in recent years has been threefold: First,
to expand the number of offenses for which extradition can be obtained by including all
conduct that is criminal under the laws of both countries and punishable by a specified
minimum period of incarceration; Second, to limit the exceptions to extradition,
particularly the exception for so-called political offenses; and Third, to improve the way
in which extradition treaties function by simplifying and clarifying provisions that were
inadequately addressed in older treaties.
Id.
73. The origin of the idea of an established international criminal court is embedded in the First
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 19, 1899, 32 Stat 1779,
26 Martens Nouveau Recucil (ser. 2d) 720. For development of this idea, see generally M. Cherif
Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New
International World Order, 25 VANDERBILT J. TRANs'L L. 151 (1992); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A
DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUrE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL'CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL (1987); Symposium, Draft International Criminal Court, 52 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT PENAL 331 (1984); Draft Statute for an International Commission of Criminal Inquiry,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CONFERENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 445, 454 (1983).
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of one state against those of another, and sought to create an International
Criminal Court with jurisdiction over terrorist crimes.7 The advent of
the Second World War, however, prevented the ratification of either
document."5
An International Criminal Court is unlikely to come into being.
Nevertheless, there are other measures under international law that could,
and should, be used in the arsenal of international counter-nuclear
terrorism measures.
First, the principle of aut dedere aut punire (extradite or
prosecute)76 needs to be applied appropriately to terrorists. Moreover,
the customary excepting of political offenses as a reason for extradition
must be abolished for genuine acts of terrorism. 7 Although such
74. Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 73, at 153 n.7 and accompanying text.
75. Id. In the absence of an authoritative international criminal court, the courts of individual
states should be used regularly to adjudicate terrorist crimes. Constitutionally, the United States has
already reserved the right to enforce international law within its own courts. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8. Here, the Constitution confers on Congress the power "to define and punish piracies and
felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." Id. Pursuant to this
Constitutional prerogative, the first Congress passed the Alien Tort Statute in 1789. Alien Tort
Statute of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). This statute authorized United States Federal Courts to
hear civil claims by aliens alleging acts committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States" when the alleged wrongdoers can be found in the United States. Id. At that time,
of course, the particular target of this legislation was piracy on the high seas. Over the years, U.S.
federal courts have rarely invoked the "law of nations," and then only in such cases where the acts
in question had already been proscribed by treaties or conventions.
In 1979, a plaintiff seeking damages for foreign acts of torture filed suit in federal court. See
Filartiga v. Americo Noberto Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In a complaint filed jointly
with his daughter, Dolly, Dr. Joel Filartiga, a well-known Paraguayan physician, artist, and opponent
of President Alfredo Stroessner's genocidal regime, alleged that members of that regime's police
force tortured and murdered his son, Joelito. Id. On June 30, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that because an international consensus condemning torture had crystallized,
torture violated the "law of nations" for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute. Id. The court further
held that U.S. courts therefore have jurisdiction under the statute to hear civil suits by the victims
of foreign torture if the alleged international outlaws are found in the United States. Id.
Although this case was a civil suit brought by a dissident against a representative of the
Paraguayan regime, the court held, in effect, that torture is a violation of the law of nations and can
be redressed in United States courts. We must now move toward a treaty that will establish a
universal criminal jurisdiction especially for terrorists. Such a treaty would further assist domestic
courts in upholding international law.
76. This expectation is deducible from the principle, nullum crimen sine poena. Existing since
antiquity, the expectation to "extradite or prosecute" has roots in both natural law (especially Jean
Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Emmerich de Vattel) and in positive law. See CHRISTOPHER L.
BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY
(1992) (giving an excellent and comprehensive scholarly elucidation of extradition and prosecution
under international law).
77. In general, U.S. courts have not allowed the political offense exception to bar extradition
of terrorists, but prominent and inappropriate exceptions have occurred. See U.S. v. Mackin, 668
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (refusing to extradite an IRA member who allegedly shot a British
policeman); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 786 F.2d (2d Cir. 1986)
12 DICK. J. INT'L L. WINTER 1994
abolition would appear to impair the prospects of even those legitimate
rights to self determination and human rights, persons proclaiming such
rights cannot be exempted from the prevailing norms of humanitarian
international law. At the moment, states acting upon extradition requests
often still give the ideological motives of the accused too much weight.
While ideological motive should be considered as a mitigating factor in
the imposition of punishment, it should not be regarded as the basis for
automatic immunity.
Where requests for extradition are improperly denied, states may act
upon the understanding that terrorists are "common enemies of mankind"
(Hostes humani generis),78 international outlaws who fall within the
scope of "universal jurisdiction." In Vattel's The Law of Nations, the
following argument is advanced:
While the jurisdiction of each State is in general limited to punishing
crimes committed in its territory, an exception must be made against
those criminals who, by the character and frequency of their crimes,
are a menace to public security everywhere and proclaim themselves
enemies of the whole human race. Men who are by profession
poisoners, assassins, or incendiaries may be exterminated wherever
they are caught; for they direct their disastrous attacks against all
Nations, by destroying the foundations of their common safety.79
Second, states must creatively interpret the Definition of Aggression
approved by the General Assembly in 1974.80 As we have seen, this
definition condemns the use of "armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State,"
but supports wars of national liberation against "colonial and racist
regimes or other forms of alien domination."'" Where it is interpreted
too broadly, such a distinction leaves international law with too little
leverage in counter-nuclear terrorist strategies. However, where it is
interpreted too narrowly, it places international law in the position of
defending the status-quo at all costs.
(refusing to extradite an IRA member charged with murdering a British soldier); In re Mackin, 80
Cr. Misc. I (S.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed sub nom.
78. Under traditional international law, this term is applied primarily to pirates. According to
Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England are the starting point for understanding
our common law: "The crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high seas, is an offence
against the universal law of society; a pirate being, according to Sir Edward Coke, Hostes humani
generis." EDWARD CoKE, 4 OF PUBLIC WRONGS 66 (Robert M. Kerr ed., 1962).
79. See VATrEL, supra note 44, at 93.
80. Resolution of the Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc.A/9631 (1975).
81. Id. art. 3(g).
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The problem, of course, is allowing international law to serve the
interests of national and international order without impairing the
legitimate objectives of international justice. 2 Who is to determine the
proper balance? Like all things human, force wears the Janus face of
good and evil at the same time. It is an age-old problem, and one not
adequately answered by identifying the institutional responsibility of the
Security Council. The deliberate vagueness of the language of the
Definition of Aggression is less of an obstacle than an opportunity if
states can see their way clear to sensible ad hoc judgments.
But how can they make such judgments? What criteria can be
applied to distinguish between lawful claims for human rights and/or self-
determination and unlawful acts of terror? Given the context of a
decentralized system of international law, individual states must bear the
ultimate responsibility for distinguishing between terrorists and "freedom
fighters." At a minimum, the principles of "just cause" and "just means"
should inform their judgments.
VI. Nuclear Terrorism: Identifying Forms and Effects
A. Nuclear Explosives
The low-technology nuclear explosives that might be manufactured
by terrorists could range anywhere from a few hundred tons to several
kilotons in yield. The destructive potential of such explosives would
82. A related problem is ensuring that criminal acts of terrorism are punished. An essential
element of all legal systems is the ancient principle, nullum crimen sine poena, or no crime without
a punishment. Yet, it is apparent that this expectation is seldom fulfilled, especially in the most
egregious violations of international law. Consider, for example, that many terrorists have yet to be
sought, apprehended, and prosecuted for their crimes. See 1973 Resolution on Principles of
International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty
of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No.
30, at 78, U.N. Doe. A/9030 (1973). Other resolutions affirm that a refusal "to cooperate in the
arrest, extradition, trial and punishment" of such persons is contrary to the United Nations Charter
"and to generally recognized norms of international law." See e.g., G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR,
26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 88, U.N. Doe. A/8429 (1971); see also, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR,
28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 96, at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64
(1946). As to the responsibility of states toward Geneva Law in particular, common article I of the
Geneva Conventions addresses the obligation of all signatories "to respect and to ensure respect"
for the Conventions "in all circumstances." See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
Common article 146 of the Geneva Civilian Convention recognizes that "[elach High Contracting
Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed ... grave breaches . I..." d  art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at
386; see also Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968).
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depend on such variables as type of construction, population density,
prevailing wind direction, weather patterns, and the characteristic features
of the target area. Such potential would be manifested in terms of three
primary effects: blast (measured in pounds per square inch of over-
pressure); heat (measured in calories/cm2); and radiation (measured in
Radiation Effective Man-REM-a combined measure that includes the
Radiation Absorbed Dose-RAD--and the Radiation Biological
Effectiveness-RBE---or the varying biological effectiveness of different
types of radiation).
Relatively crude nuclear explosives with yields equivalent to about
1,000 tons of high explosive would be far easier to fabricate than
explosives with yields equivalent to about 10 kilotons of high explosive.
Nonetheless, explosives with a yield of only one-tenth of a kiloton would
pose significant destructive effects. A nuclear explosive in this limited
range could annihilate the Capitol during the State of the Union Address
or knock down the World Trade Center towers in New York City. An
even smaller yield of 10 tons of TNT could kill everyone attending the
Super Bowl.
In assessing the destructiveness of nuclear explosions, 3 it is
important to remember that such explosions are typically more damaging
than chemical explosions of equivalent yields. This is the case because
nuclear explosions produce energy in the form of penetrating radiations
(gamma rays and neutrons) as well as in blast wave and heat. Moreover,
a nuclear explosion on the ground-the kind of nuclear explosion most
likely to be used by terrorists-produces more local fallout than a
comparable explosion in the air.
B. Radiological Weapons
Radiological weapons are not as widely understood as nuclear
explosives, but they are equally ominous in their effects. Placed in the
hands of terrorists, such weapons could pose a lethal hazard for human
beings anywhere in the world. Even a world already dominated by every
variety of numbing could not fail to recoil from such a prospect.
Radiological weapons are devices designed to disperse radioactive
materials that have been produced a substantial time before their
83. There is now a huge literature that deals with the expected consequences of a nuclear war.
For works by this author, see for example, Louis R. BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE
IN WORLD POL11ICS (1980); Louis R. BERES, MIMICKING SISYPHUS: AMERICA'S COUNTERVAILING
NUCLEAR STRATEGY (1983); Louis R. BERES, REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
AND WORLD ORDER (1984); and LOUIS R. BERES, SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR
STRATEGY (1986).
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dispersal. The targets against which terrorists might choose to use
radiological weapons include concentrations of people inside buildings,
concentrations of people on urban streets or at sports events, urban areas
with a high population density as a whole, and agricultural areas. The
form such weapons might take include plutonium dispersal devices (only
3.5 ounces of plutonium could prove lethal to everyone within a large
office building or factory) or devices designed to disperse other
radioactive materials. In principle, the dispersal of spent nuclear reactor
fuel and the fission products separated from reactor fuels would create
grave hazards in a populated area, but the handling of such materials
would be very dangerous to terrorists themselves. It is more likely,
therefore, that would-be users of radiological weapons would favor
plutonium over radioactive fission products.
The threat of nuclear terrorism involving radiological weapons is
potentially more serious than the threat involving nuclear explosives.
This is because it would be easier for terrorists to achieve nuclear
capability with radiological weapons. Such weapons, therefore, could
also be the subject of a more plausible hoax than nuclear explosives.
C. Nuclear Reactor Sabotage
In the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, even the average
layperson has become familiar with the meaning of "reactor-core
meltdown." Such an event, in which a reactor deprived of its
temperature-controlling coolant melts in its own heat and produces lethal
clouds of radioactive gases, could be the objective of future terrorism.
Significantly, incidents involving violence or threats of violence at
nuclear facilities at home and abroad are already a matter of record.
In comparison with a low-yield nuclear explosion, a reactor-core
meltdown and breach of containment would release a small amount of
radiation. However, the consequences of such an event would still
involve leakage of an immense amount of gaseous radioactive material
that could expose neighboring populations to immediate death, cancer, or
genetic defects. To better understand the nature of the threat, we must
first try to understand the fundamentals of nuclear reactors.
Essentially, these reactors may be characterized as giant teakettles
that turn water into steam. The steam is piped to large turbines that turn
generators. When a typical "teakettle" is operating at full power, the
radioactivity in its fuel core can reach 17 billion curies, enough-in
principle-to kill everyone on the planet. Within the uranium fuel rods
in the core, the fission reaction can unleash energy to drive the
temperature above 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit-a temperature hot enough
to melt through all protective barriers.
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From the standpoint of radiation discharged, the consequences of a
successful conventional attack upon nuclear reactors could equal those of
the worst accidental meltdown. This form of nuclear terrorism could
result in moderate to major releases of radioactivity into the environment.
Additional problems would arise through the release of the inventories of
spent fuel customarily located at reactor sites. Early fatalities are
possible, although late cancers and genetic effects would dominate. In
densely populated countries deaths could number in the tens of thousands.
Whatever form nuclear terrorism might take-nuclear explosives,
radiological weapons, or nuclear reactor sabotage-its effects would be
social and political as well as biological and physical. In the aftermath
of a nuclear terrorist event, both governments and insurgents would be
confronted with mounting pressures to escalate to higher-order uses of
force. With terrorists more inclined to think of nuclear weapons as
manifestly "thinkable," both governments and terrorists would find
themselves giving serious consideration to striking first.
VII. Identifying the Preemption Option
In view of the enormously destructive consequences of nuclear
terrorism, governments may have to resort to strategies of preemption in
certain cases. 4 Where the terrorist group functions within the target
state, the authorities must be concerned with the protection of civil
liberties. Where the terrorist group operates from the territory of one or
more sympathetic host states, the authorities in the prospective target state
must be concerned with the normative constraints of international law,
specifically the parameters of anticipatory self defense.8"
International law is not a suicide pact. The right of self defense by
forestalling an armed attack was already established by Hugo Grotius in
84. See STEVEN SLOAN, BEATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: AN ACTION STRATEGY FOR
PREEMPTION AND PUNISHMENT (1986) (giving an unusually frank discussion of "terrorism
preemption" from a tactical point of view).
85. For more by this author on anticipatory self defense under international law, see Louis R.
Beres, Preserving the Third Temple: Israel's Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International
Law, 26 VANDERBILT J. TRANS'L L. 111 (1993); Louis R. Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel,
Preemption and Anticipatory Self Defense, 13 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 259 (1991); Louis R. Beres,
Striking 'First': Israel's Post-Gulf War Options Under International Law, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 1 (1991); Louis R. Beres, Israel and Anticipatory Self Defense, 8 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 89 (1991); Louis R. Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel 'Palestine', and Anticipatory Self
Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71 (1992). For an examination of assassination as a permissible
form of anticipatory self defense, see Louis R. Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense:
The Case of Israel, 20 HOFSTRA LAW REV. 321 (1991); Louis R. Beres, On Assassination as
Anticipatory Self-Defense: Is It Permissible?, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 13 (1992).
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1625.6 Recognizing the need for "present danger" and for threatening
behavior that is "imminent in a point of time," Grotius indicates that self
defense is to be permitted not only after an attack has already been
suffered but also in advance, where "the deed may be anticipated.
t87
Or, as he says a bit further on in the same chapter, "It be lawful to kill
him who is preparing to kill . . .,,"
A similar position is taken by Emmerich de Vattel:
The safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A
nation has the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon
it, and to use force and every other just means of resistance against
the aggressor. It may even anticipate the other's design, being
careful, however, not to act upon vague and doubtful suspicions, lest
it should run the risk of becoming itself the aggressor.89
The customary right of anticipatory self defense has its modem
origins in the case of The Caroline, which concerned the unsuccessful
rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule (a rebellion that
aroused sympathy and support in U.S. border states). 9 In an exchange
86. HuGo GROTIus, 2 DE JURI BELLI ET PACIs 206-07 (William Whiwell trans., 1853) (1625).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 207. In other sections of his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, Grotius
wrote:
Now, as Cicero explains, this [justification for preemption] exists whenever he who
chooses to wait [for formal declarations] will be obliged to pay an unjust penalty before
he can exact a just penalty; and, in a general sense, it exists whenever matters do not
admit of delay. Thus it is obvious that a just war can be waged in return, without
recourse to judicial procedure, against an opponent who has begun an unjust war; nor will
any declaration of that just war be required .... For-as Aelian says, citing Plato as his
authority-any war undertaken for the necessary repulsion of injury, is proclaimed not by
a crier nor by a herald but by the voice of Nature herself.
HuGo GRoTius, DE lURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS 96 (James Brown Scott ed., Gladys L. Williams
& Walter H. Zeydel trans., 1964) (1604).
89. EMMERICH DE VATrEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS 130 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916)
(1758). Let us recall, here, Pufendorf's argument in On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to
Natural Law:
where it is quite clear that the other is already planning an attack upon me, even though
he has not yet fully revealed his intentions, it will be permitted at once to begin forcible
self-defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief, provided there be no hope
that, when admonished in a friendly spirit, he may put off his hostile temper; or if such
admonition be likely to injure our cause. Hence, he is to be regarded as the aggressor,
who first conceived the wish to injure, and prepared himself to carry it out. But the
excuse of self-defense will be his, who by quickness shall overpower his slower assailant.
And for defense, it is not required that one receive the first blow, or merely avoid and
parry those aimed at him.
PUFENDORF, supra note 34, at 32.
90. See The Caroline, JOHN B. MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906),
reprinted in Louis HENKIN ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 622 (2d ed. 1987).
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of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and
Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a
framework for self defense that did not require an actual attack.9'
There, military response to a threat was judged permissible so long as the
danger posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means
and no moment for deliberation."92  Following this case, the serious
threat of armed attack has generally been taken to justify militarily
defensive action.
Today, some scholars argue that the specific language of Article 51
of the UN Charter has overridden the customary right of anticipatory self-
defense articulated by The Caroline.93 In this view, Article 51 fashions
a new and far more restrictive statement on self-defense, one that relies
on the literal qualification contained at Article 51, "if an armed attack
occurs." 94  However, this interpretation ignores the argument that
international law cannot reasonably compel a state to wait until it absorbs
a devastating, or even lethal, first strike before acting to protect itself.
Moreover, in the nuclear age-when waiting to be struck first may be
equivalent to accepting annihilation-the right of anticipatory self defense
is especially apparent.
What about the territorial sovereignty of states that host terrorist
groups? Wouldn't preemptive attack against terrorists contemplating use
of nuclear weapons violate such sovereignty and represent, therefore, an
act of aggression?" Not at all! As we have already noted, states have
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER
art. 51.
94. Id.
95. Since World War Two, aggression has typically been defined as a military attack not
justified by international law directed against the territory of another state. The question of defining
aggression first acquired particular significance with the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923.
See Report of the Permanent Advisory Commission of the League of Nations, LEAGUE OF NATIONs
O.J. Spec. Supp. 16, at 7 (1923). By a resolution of November 17, 1950, the U.N. General
Assembly decided to refer to the International Law Commission a proposal of the U.S.S.R.
concerning the definition of aggression. See G.A. Res. 378B, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Annex 1,
Agenda Item 72, at 4, U.N. Doc. AIC.1/608 (1950). The U.N. General Assembly adopted an
authoritative definition of aggression without a vote. See G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975). Article 1 is based on U.N. Charter Article 2(4),
enjoining members from "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state." Id. art. I. Article 2 provides that the first use of armed force represents
"prima facie" evidence of unlawful conduct, but that "other relevant circumstances" may also be
taken into account. Id. art. 2. The requirement that to be aggression, the first use of force must be
"in conformity with the Charter" clarifies that there may exist some first use of force that is entirely
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the obligation under international law to prevent their territory from being
used as a base for terrorist operations against another state. Where this
obligation is not met, the normal prerogatives of sovereignty are forfeited
with regard to the preemption choices of certain victim states. a6
In certain residual instances, such forfeiture may even justify
assassination as a limited strategy of counter-nuclear terrorism. Of
course, there are very specific rules of international law that must still be
followed.97 For example, it is essential that the intended victims be
painstakingly identified as prospective nuclear terrorists; that they be
distinguished from lawful insurgents according to the previously
discussed criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello; that they be
authoritatively presumed to be preparing for specific forms of nuclear
terrorism; that such a presumption be determined "beyond a reasonable
doubt;"9' and that all alternative strategies of counter-nuclear terrorism
be determined unworkable.
Under the U.S. Constitution, Amendments IV, V, VI, and VIII
comprise a "bill of rights" for accused persons, and the phrase "due
process of law" derives from Chapter 29 of Magna Carta (1225). 99
lawful. Id. It follows, inter alia, that to qualify as aggression, use of force must be carried out to
achieve a prohibited objective, i.e., that animus aggressionis is an essential element of the offense.
96. Here it is instructive to recall Vattel's argument on the observance of justice between
nations:
Justice is the foundation of all social life and the secure bond of all civil intercourse.
Human society, instead of being an interchange of friendly assistance, would be no more
than a vast system of robbery if no respect were shown for the virtue which gives to each
his own. Its observance is even more necessary between Nations than between
individuals, because injustice between Nations may be followed by the terrible
consequences involved in an affray between powerful political bodies, and because it is
more difficult to obtain redress .... An intentional act of injustice is certainly an injury.
A Nation has, therefore, the right to punish it. . . . The right to resist injustice is derived
from the right of self-protection.
See VATTrEL, supra note 44, at 135.
97. See Louis R. Beres, Victims and Executioners: Atrocity, Assassination and International
Law, 7 CAMBIDGE REV. INT'L AFFAIRS 1 (1993).
98. The "beyond reasonable doubt" standard that has characterized the Anglo-American criminal
justice system for more than two hundred years is a component of the broader question of the theory
of evidence. Evidentiary doctrines are associated with arrest, pretrial examination, and grand jury
indictment. Historically, the study of reasonable doubt has been linked to the work of juries.
English law was affected by John Locke's AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1690),
which presented an ordered account of levels of probability. Locke's criteria for evaluating testimony
emphasized the number of witnesses, their integrity, their skill at presenting evidence, and the
testimony's agreement with the circumstances and the presence or absence of contrary testimony.
Samuel Pufendorf links the concept of "conscience" to notions of moral certainty and beyond
reasonable doubt. PUFENDORF, supra note 34, at 17, 21. For Pufendorf, the "satisfied conscience"
of a jury required rational, unbiased, and unemotional acts of the understanding. Id.
99. The Magna Carta marks an important first step toward constitutional privilege and the
subjection of kings to parliamentary will. An account of the original versions of the Charter and of
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There, the King promises that "no free man (nullus liber homo) shall be
taken or imprisoned or deprived of his freehold or his liberties of free
customs, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, nor shall we
come upon him or send against him, except by a legal judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land: (per legem terrae)."'00  Yet, the
foundations of English and American constitutional protections were not
confronted with the altogether unique technological hazards of the present
moment, and there may develop certain circumstances where total
faithfulness to ordinary civil protections could produce "death" to an
entire commonwealth. This does not suggest, to be sure, a capricious
disregard for constitutional safeguards as a permissible element of
counter-nuclear terrorism, but an ad hoc balance of foreseeable harms as
a reasonable standard of judgment when assassination is under
consideration.
VIII. Conclusion
The end of the Cold War has not brought the United States into a
more harmonious era of international relations. Quite the contrary. With
the end of bipolar capabilities for conflict management, this country may
now be confronted with increased involvement in foreign wars and with
expanded risks of terrorist attack. Under certain circumstances, as we
have already seen, such risks could include even nuclear terrorism.
International law, though limited in its potential for preventing
nuclear terrorism, should not be disregarded. At a minimum, it can
provide explicit, identifiable, and indispensable criteria for distinguishing
between permissible and impermissible forms of insurgency. At a
maximum, it can offer effective guidelines for the preemption option,
including - under genuinely extraordinary conditions - assassination as
an essential strategy of counter-nuclear terrorism. Ironic as such a
strategy may appear, especially because assassination can also be
considered a form of terrorism in times of peace, there are circumstances
where the prospective benefits would greatly outweigh the expected
costs. 01
later editions and commentaries appears in WILLIAM S. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 165-85 (2d ed.
1914). The final version, dated June 15, 1215, is reprinted in ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND,
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 17-32 (1965).
100. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 99.
101. On this point, see Louis R. Beres, Victims and Executioners: Atrocity, Assassination and
International Law, in CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 1 (1993); Louis R. Beres, On Assassination as
Anticipatory Self-Defense: Is It Permissible?, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 13 (1992); Louis R. Beres,
Assassinating Saddam: A Post-War View from International Law, 19 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 613
(1991); Louis R. Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20
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We live in troubling times, the times W.B. Yeats foresaw in his
poem, THE SECOND COMING:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity. 2
To survive these times, the "best" will need to recover "all conviction."
As for the "worst," who will now have the capacity for inflicting nuclear
terror upon U.S. civilian populations, they are certain to remain "full of
passionate intensity." It follows that international legal remedies for
nuclear terrorism must focus upon (1) creating distance between terrorists
and pertinent nuclear technologies, (2) creating cooperative processes and
arrangements between pertinent states, and (3) creating appropriate
incentives and disincentives for terrorist decision-making. Taken
together, these focal points could immobilize the effects of "passionate
intensity" and restrain terrorist activity within tolerable and enforceable
limits.
There is one more thing. International legal remedies, pursuant to
Article VI of our Constitution and several decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, are part of the law of the United States °3  Hence, such
remedies carry with them not only tactical, but also jurisprudential
imperatives. Thus, the official U.S. witnessing of the September 13,
1993 agreement between Israel and the P.L.O. 0 4 not only violated
international law, but also U.S. municipal law. When, on September 28,
HOFSTRA L. REV. 321 (1992); Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination
During Peace and War, 5 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 231 (1991).
102. See THE LETTERS OF W.B. YEATS 94 (Allan Wade ed., 1954).
103. See supra note 6.
104. For full text of the agreement, see The Text: 'Put an End to Decades of Confrontation and
Conflict, 'N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1993, at A8. Significantly, from the standpoint of international law,
this agreement is not a treaty. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty
is always an international agreement "concluded between States." See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969) (entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980). For the requirements of statehood under international law, see Convention
on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (entered into force
Dec. 26, 1934, for the United States Dec. 26, 1934).
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1993, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Middle East
Peace Facilitation Act of 1993105 - an approval that clearly
undermines this country's capacity to prevent nuclear terrorism - it
exacerbated these violations." 6 Conflicting with the most essential
norms of international law and, therefore, with the "supreme law of the
land"'0 7 in the United States, this Act - which "permits" U.S.
contributions to international organizations that provide benefits to the
P.L.O. and allows the P.L.O. to establish an office in Washington - is
clearly unlawful.
To prevent nuclear terrorism, the United States cannot have it both
ways. It simply will not do to celebrate certain terrorist organizations on
the one hand, while condemning assorted terrorist organizations on the
other hand. Washington must display a uniform and consistent opposition
to all terrorist groups, irrespective of considerations for short-term
political gain by the President or by members of Congress. In the
absence of such opposition, terrorist leaders worldwide will likely
calculate that the benefits of persistent violent action outweigh the costs
and - most ominously of all - that the prospective benefits of nuclear
violence may be especially cost-effective.
105. See Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993, H.R. REP. No. 283, 103d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1993). The Act, which has not yet been printed, will appear in the future as Public Law 103-125.
106. Regarding the criminal responsibility of individual PLO perpetrators of terrorist crimes
committed under the direction of PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat, the principle is well-established that
orders pursuant to "domestic law" (in this case, by analogy, PLO "law") are no defense to violations
of international law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser.
AIB) No. 46, at 167; Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig (parties abbreviated), 1932 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 46, at 24; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 3.2. On the principle of command responsibility (respondeat superior) as it
pertains to Yassir Arafat and PLO terrorist crimes, see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945); The High
Command Case (The Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb), 12 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
I, 71 (United Nations War Crimes Commission Comp. 1949); Parks, Command Responsibility for
War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1973); O'Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and
Vietnam, 60 GEO. L.J. 605 (1972); U.S. DEPT OF THE ARMY, ARMY SUBJECT SCHEDULE No. 27-1
10 (1970). The direct individual responsibility of Yassir Arafat for PLO crimes is altogether
unambiguous in view of the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, which denies defendants any
right of the act of state defense, a right which would in any event be inadmissible for the leader of
a non-state insurgent organization. OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY, REPORT ON IRAQ, WAR CRIMES (DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM) 116 (1992)
(unclassified version). Significantly, in addition to his responsibility for PLO terrorist crimes, Yassir
Arafat gave his approval to crimes for war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity
Saddam Hussein committed during the second Gulf War. Id. Indeed, units of the Palestine
Liberation Army (P.L.A.) served with Saddam's forces in occupied Kuwait, making them (and him)
complicit in multiple crimes of extraordinary horror and ferocity. Id.
107. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
